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ABSTRACT
Sociological research has greatly increased our 
understanding of the negotiations which lead to lay 
diagnoses of mental illness. Many suggestions from 
this research remain unexplored, however. This study 
considers two of those suggestions. First, the study 
considers the suggestion that the closeness of relation­
ship between decision-maker and symptomatic person might 
affect perceptions and explanations of symptomatic 
behavior. Second, the study considers the suggestion 
that the negotations leading to lay diagnoses of mental 
illness might best be seen as examples of "satisficing" 
behavior. The findings suggest that, although "close­
ness" may influence mental illness decision-making, the 
reasons behind its influence may be more complex than 
the previous research suggests. The study suggests that 
this complexity might be captured by a "satisficing" 
model.
FACTORS IN LAY DIAGNOSES OF MENTAL ILLNESS: 
CLOSENESS OF RELATIONSHIP AND "DE-SATISFICING" EVENTS
2INTRODUCTION
Although psychiatry has developed tools for the 
diagnosis of mental illness, the identification of someone as 
"mentally ill" is usually made first by non-professional 
family or community members. How and why this identification 
comes about have been a concern in a number of sociological 
works. This paper presents findings from research on two 
particular topics within this concern: the negotiations
between symptomatic person and decision-maker, and factors 
which affect the outcomes of such negotiations. In the 
following pages, I will examine the previous research 
relevant to this issue, detail the research problem and 
methods, and then present and discuss the research findings.
MENTAL ILLNESS AND SOCIAL CONTEXT
As Szasz (1987) has indicated, the concept of illness 
implies deviation from some sort of norm. An idea behind 
much of the sociology of mental illness is that the behaviors 
we see as "symptoms" of mental illness are ones which violate 
social norms (see Goffman, 1963, 1967, 1971; Scheff, 1966). 
Proponents of this idea hold that this is no mere 
coincidence. They argue the reason most "mentally ill"
3persons are identified as such really has nothing to do with 
whatever "medical" or "mental" norms they may have 
transgressed and really everything to do with the social 
norms they have — or are said to have ^-transgressed.
Goffman (1963) and Scheff (1966) suggest that symptoms 
of mental illness run counter to what might be thought of as 
the "public order" — those particular social norms which 
determine the contexts in which behavior is "appropriate" or 
"inappropriate." A good example of such a norm is what 
Goffman formulates as the "norm of involvement":
[This norm] is evident in the exploitation of 
untaxing involvements to rationalize or mask 
desired lolling — a way of covering one's 
physical presence in a situation with a veneer 
of acceptable visible activity. Certain 
minimal "recreational" activities are used as 
covers for disengagement, as in the case of 
"fishing" off river banks where it is 
guaranteed that no fish will disturb one's 
reverie, or "getting a tan" on the beach 
— activity that shields reverie or sleep 
although...a special uniform may have to be 
worn which proclaims and institutionalizes the 
relative inactivity (Goffman, 1963: 58).
The norm requiring that an adult in certain contexts be 
"involved" is unstated and unspecified in our society, but, 
as Goffman indicates, it exerts quite an influence over our 
actions. For Scheff, the most important aspect of such norms 
is this unspecified, yet powerful, nature. The acts of 
staring off into space and describing one's sexual fantasies, 
for example, might be wholly appropriate within some contexts 
and wholly inappropriate within others. The norms governing
4these contexts are not easily articulated or specified.
Still, we take for granted that others will act according to 
them. When they do not, the "unsaid" nature of the norms 
makes it difficult for us to categorize their violation. For 
instance, the man who stares off into space and describes his 
sexual fantasies during a session with his psychotherapist 
would probably be seen as reasonably "normal." The man who 
performs those same behaviors during his wedding ceremony is 
harder to categorize. Scheff suggests that, because our 
society provides no explicit label for the violation of such 
"unstated" norms, we resort to the residual catch-all 
category of "mental illness."
Goffman (1971) and Mechanic (1962) add that whether we 
see someone as "mentally ill" also depends on how we 
interpret their behavior. Goffman says it is often not so 
much the "norm violating-ness" of a behavior which makes us 
see someone as mentally disturbed as it is the way that 
violation calls into question certain fundamental beliefs:
Even when the patient hallucinates or develops 
exotic beliefs, the concern of the family is 
not simply that a member has crazy notions, 
but that he is not keeping his place in 
relationships. Someone to whom we are closely 
related is someone who ought not to have 
beliefs which estrange him from us....The 
issue here is not that the family finds their 
home life is made unpleasant by the sick 
person. Perhaps most home life is unpleasant. 
The issue is that meaningful existence is 
threatened.... The family members are less 
connected to [the patient] than they had 
thought (Goffman, 1971: 365-366).
5This is an important distinction. Goffman is saying that 
whether or not a family or community member sees a behavior 
as "inappropriate” or "unpleasant" is often less crucial in 
their decision to see someone as "mentally ill" than their 
belief that the behavior calls fundamental ties into 
question. These ties connect the actor and the person 
observing and judging his act: "He is like me," "He finds
joy in the same things I do," and so on. It is one thing for 
us to be disturbed by someone's behavior and quite another 
thing to have that behavior make us question whether 
fundamental ties still link us to that person. Once that 
sort of questioning begins, Goffman says, we are more likely 
to see that person as mentally ill.
In a very similar vein, Mechanic (1962) suggests that 
when family and community members are confronted with 
norm-violating behaviors they "assume the role" of the 
violator and attempt to understand the motives behind his 
behavior. If they are not able to do so, they are likely to 
see the norm violator's behavior as a "symptom" of mental 
illness. Although Mechanic does not explain this process 
fully, he seems to have in mind something similar to what 
Goffman describes: the family or community members, unable
to realistically imagine the other's motives, begin to view 
that person as fundamentally different.
The arguments Goffman, Scheff, and Mechanic make contain 
a common thread: whether a behavior is seen as a "mental
6symptom" or not depends upon the social context in which it 
occurs. A lay diagnosis of mental illness, however, does not 
spring neatly from every miscombination of context and act. 
Although such a combination may plant the seed, there is no 
guarantee that a diagnosis of mental illness will ever come 
about (Scheff, 1966: 31-32, 41-47; Goffman, 1963: 240).
Such diagnoses, when they do occur, are usually an outcome of 
negotiations within the situation itself (Aday, 1990: 12-17,
141) .
NEGOTIATIONS WITHIN SOCIAL CONTEXT
The path-breaking work in this area was that done by
Yarrow and her colleagues (1955) on the processes through
which wives of mentally ill men first came to define their 
husband's behaviors as symptoms of mental illness. At first, 
various behaviors and episodes violated the wives' 
expectations and did not seem readily understandable. The 
wives, however, did not immediately conclude that the
behaviors were evidence of mental illness or even that they
were problematic. The shift toward such conclusions resulted 
from an eventual "piling up" of such events rather than from 
a single strange or bizarre episode. Yarrow and her 
colleagues maintain that the wives found it personally 
threatening to recognize mental illness in their spouses and, 
therefore, tried brushing away that explanation with a 
variety of defenses. Some "normalized" the behavior by
7pointing out instances when others performed such acts; some 
"attenuated" the seriousness of the behavior by finding 
explanations other than mental illness; some "balanced" the 
situation by finding normal episodes to cancel out the 
abnormal ones; and some simply "denied" the legitimacy of 
mental illness as an explanation.
Following in Yarrow's footsteps, a recent work by Whitt 
and Meile (1985) specifies those factors which seem to 
influence how "problematic" and "threatening" a 
decision-maker finds such situations: (a) the physical
reality of the symptoms, (b) the need to account for them,
(c) the need to deal with the symptoms in a way which 
minimizes personal costs, and (d) the number of alternative 
explanations available (1985: 684). The influence and
interaction of these factors are evident in the phenomenon 
Whitt and Meile call "magnification" (1985: 690-692).
Simply, the closer the decision-maker's relationship with the 
symptomatic person, the more likely it is he will find that 
person's behavior problematic. This does not mean, however, 
that the decision-maker will see that problem in terms of 
mental illness. On the contrary, such an explanation is less 
likely due to the "personal threat" of recognizing mental 
illness in someone so close. As this "social distance" 
increases, however, both the need to account for the 
symptomatic behavior and the personal cost involved decrease. 
In such cases, it is less likely that the behavior will be 
seen as a problem but more likely that, in those instances
8when the behavior is seen as a problem, it will also be seen 
as evidence of mental illness. Consider the following 
example:
A young man has been mumbling to himself and 
masturbating openly in his home for almost a 
week now. His mother, Mrs. L, a divorcee in 
her forties, pays little attention to his 
behavior, hoping that ignoring it will 
convince her son to stop. Over the past week, 
however, Mrs. L has begun a relationship with 
a man from across town. Last night, as they 
were parting company, this man asked if he 
could meet her son. She replied that her son 
was ill and could not have visitors for a 
while. What can she say the next time he 
asks? What if he should meet her son and find 
him masturbating and mumbling to himself? 
Would he think less of her? Would he be 
likely to end their relationship? What should 
she do?
Now, consider this same situation from another person's 
viewpoint — a neighbor's.
Mrs. K, a neighbor of Mrs. L's, has heard 
some strange rumors about Mrs. L's son. The 
rumors, as told by the children who attempted 
to visit with Mrs. L's son and were turned 
away by Mrs. L, say the boy has just been 
walking around the house and masturbating and 
mumbling to himself for almost a week now.
What are the different ways these women are likely to 
characterize and respond to this situation? Whitt and Meile 
would suggest that Mrs. L is more likely to find her son's 
behavior problematic and personally threatening than is Mrs. 
K because she is faced with both the physical reality of his 
behaviors and a need to.account for them. However, they
9would also suggest that Mrs. L is less likely to see the 
"problem" as evidence of mental illness than is Mrs. K 
because such a definition would be "personally threatening."
Works by Emerson and Messinger (1977) and Sampson and 
his associates (1964) suggest something similar. The 
decision-maker these authors portray, however, is less caught 
up in the types of hedonistic calculus Whitt and Meile 
describe than he is in continuing attempts to find a strategy 
which works:
A difficulty arises, a remedy is sought and 
applied; it works temporarily or not at all; 
then some new remedy is sought. The result 
tends to be a recurring cycle or trouble, 
remedy, failure, more trouble, and new remedy, 
until the trouble stops or the troubled person 
forsakes further efforts. As a consequence of 
these processes, the trouble is progressively 
elaborated, analyzed, and specified as to type 
and cause (Emerson and Messinger, 1977: 122).
The distinction is a fine one: whereas Yarrow and her
colleagues and Whitt and Meile suggest the decision-maker's 
primary criterion is personal interest — what "works" in 
terms of his personal goals and motives, these other authors 
suggest the decision-maker's criteria may be more elusive and 
his decision-making less rational.
This notion echoes March and Simon's (1958) 
understanding that many — perhaps even most — decisions are 
made under less than ideal circumstances and in less than 
ideal ways. Few of the decisions we make, they say, are 
fully rational, take into account all the pertinent
10
information, or aim for optimal results. Instead, we gather 
the information most easily available, dispense with careful 
reasoning, and hope the results of our decision will "get us 
by" with few problems. This sort of strategy — what March 
and Simon call "satisficing" — seems the essence of much 
family and community decision-making, including that 
concerning mental illness.
r
Seen in this light, the request Mrs. L's boyfriend 
makes of her is one that renders her previous "satisficing" 
strategy (ignoring the behavior and hoping it will stop) 
unsatisfactory. The same event, meanwhile, means nothing to 
Mrs. K's relationship with Mrs. L's son because whatever 
"satisficing" strategy she may have taken toward the boy 
(keeping her children away, complaining to neighbors) remains 
"satisficing."
Given this change, Mrs. L may seek to "re-satisfice" 
her situation by defining her son's problem as mental illness 
and treating it as such, but this is not necessarily the 
first or only strategy she may consider. Instead, as March 
and Simon point out, the direction of such steps is usually 
determined by whatever information and resources the 
decision-maker has available. For instance, Mrs. L's 
decision may or may not be informed by ideas concerning 
mental illness and its treatment and, even if it is, she may 
not choose that strategy for reasons of resources (perhaps 
she lacks the necessary funds or perhaps her decision is 
swayed by a chance to have the boy stay with other family
11
members). In any event, she will pick — usually under the 
less-than-ideal circumstances and in the less-than-ideal ways 
March and Simon describe — the strategy that seems most 
likely to "satisfice" her situation. She will then stay with 
that strategy until her situation changes and the strategy no 
longer "satisfices." For instance, Mrs. L may place her son 
in a mental hospital and realize, after visiting him a few 
times, that he is very unhappy there. If his happiness 
figures heavily among her few "satisficing" criteria, she may 
decide that hospitalization — despite the benefits it may 
have for her new romance — will not "satisfice." She would 
then seek yet another strategy. In the end (if, indeed, Mrs. 
L's search for a "satisficing" strategy ever ends), whether 
her son is seen as "mentally ill" or "mentally healthy" or 
something else will be an outcome negotiated over the course 
of this process.
Overall, these pieces of research suggest two distinct 
causal relationships within this negotiating process:
(1) The closer the relationship between the 
decision-maker and the symptomatic person, the 
more likely it is the decision-maker will find 
the symptomatic person's behavior problematic 
and threatening and the less likely it is he 
will see that behavior as evidence of mental 
illness.
(2) Events occurring outside the relationship 
between decision-maker and symptomatic person 
may "de-satisfice" the decision-maker's 
strategy for dealing with the problems 
presented by that relationship. Because of 
this effect, the decision-maker may turn to
12
strategies based on concepts of mental 
illness.
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
Although the processes and outcomes suggested by this 
previous research seem to make sense, they have not been the 
subject of systematic study. The research presented here 
represents an attempt to correct that situation. The general 
questions behind this research are simple:
(1) Is it true that family members are more 
likely than others to find symptomatic 
behavior problematic and threatening?
(2) Is it true that family members are less 
likely than others to see such behaviors as 
evidence of mental illness?
(3) Is it true that disrupting — or 
"de-satisficing" events — impact the
relationship between decision-maker and 
symptomatic person in such a way as to make 
more likely a coping strategy based on 
concepts of mental illness?
THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Although previous research usually involved field work 
or examination of official records, neither of those 
methodologies was chosen for this research. Such methods 
bring us closer to "real life" than other methods might, but 
by doing so they plunge us into a realm in which confounding 
variables abound and experimental control is nearly 
impossible. For instance, the researcher might encounter 
conflicting records and testimonies (Emerson and Messinger,
13
1977: 125) or ones colored by the help-seeking acts or
diagnoses themselves (Scheff, 1966). He may hear dozens of 
conflicting accounts as to how and why and when certain 
decisions occurred and be unable to determine the verity of 
any — except, perhaps, through extensive (and, thus, 
ethically troubling) cross-examination.
One major difficulty with suggestions from the previous 
research is that they often spring from such swamps of 
causality. Recall, for example, Yarrow's suggestion that the 
wives' denial was motivated by "personal threat." Nowhere do 
Yarrow and her colleagues provide evidence for this point. 
Instead, it is an interpretation based on the fact that the 
subjects were involved in close personal relationships 
(Yarrow, 1955: 23). While Yarrow's suggestion is
reasonable, it is perhaps just as likely that the wives' 
reluctance to embrace a "mental illness" explanation arose 
from other factors present in their situations — ones that 
Yarrow and her colleagues simply disregard.
The task of my methodology was to avoid such confounding 
variables while addressing the research issues squarely. 
Scenario-based research, with its capacity for creating 
controlled analogs of "real life" situations, seemed to 
provide a way of doing that. In order to use the method 
effectively, however, my scenarios would have to be very 
different from ones used in the past (see Star, 1955; 
Phillips, 1962, 1963). For example, instead of casting the 
reader as a passive observer, the scenarios would have to
14
draw him into the situation as an active decision-maker.
And, instead of simply presenting a list of symptoms, they 
would have to detail an evocative and believable situation.
At the same time, the scenarios would have to control 
key factors that might obscure the effects of the 
experimental variables. Such factors (symptoms, behaviors, 
circumstances, and So on) would have to be identical or very 
similar in each scenario. Only the independent variables 
themselves — the closeness of the decision-maker, the 
presence or absense of a "de-satisficing” event — could 
differ significantly from one scenario to another. Attempts 
would have to be made also to manage confounding factors not 
managed within the scenarios themselves. These attempts 
would have to focus, especially, on those factors most likely 
to impact the dependent variables. The methodology focused 
on two particular factors of this sort, the first indicated 
by previous reseach and the second indicated by the author’s 
experience: (a) individual differences in backgrounds and
values, and (b) familiarity with mental illness and mental 
illness treatment.
The research was designed and carried out with these 
considerations in mind. Eighty-six volunteers were asked to 
assume a role — "family" or "non-family" — while reading a 
fictional case study that included that role (see Appendix A 
for annotated samples of these). Each scenario described the 
volunteer's relationship with "John," a thirteen year old 
boy. In the "family" condition, the volunteer's role was
15
that of a college-age sibling caring for John during an 
extended parental absense. In the "non-family" condition, 
the role was that of a college-age neighbor called in to 
baby-sit during a similar absense. In both conditions, John 
was described as manifesting behaviors that could be 
interpreted as symptoms of mental illness: social
withdrawal, talking to himself, and occasional violent 
outbursts. In half of the scenarios for each condition, a 
potentially "de-satisficing" event was introduced. In both 
the family and non-family conditions, this event involved a 
new romantic interest for the decision-maker: someone who
might be troubled by John's behavior. In the other half this 
event was absent.
Table 1. Research design in four-celled format
closeness of relationship between 
decision-maker and symptomatic person
family: non-family:
"de-satisficing" 
event is
present? yes:
no:
condition 1
- - - — .......
condition 2
condition 3
L .
condition 4
i
This design involves two independent variables and three 
dependent variables. The two independent variables
16
(closeness of relationship between decision-maker and 
symptomatic person, presence or absense of a "de-satisficing” 
event) were manipulated to create four scenarios and, thus, 
four distinct experimental conditions: (1) "family" responds
to "event present," (2) "non-family" responds to "event 
present," (3) "family" responds to "event absent," and (4) 
"non-family" responds to "event absent" (see Table 1). The 
three dependent variables of concern were the respondents1 
characterizations of the hypothetical situation, their 
explanations of the situation, and their reactions to the 
situation. These were measured through responses to a short 
questionnaire which followed the scenarios. The specifics of 
this questionnaire are discussed more fully below.
You will note that the methodology operationalizes the 
"closeness" variable in terms of family or non-family status. 
This was done quite purposefully. In the literature 
(especially Whitt and Meile, 1985) these concepts are used 
quite loosely and almost interchangeably. What these authors 
have in mind when they talk about a "close" relationship is 
unclear, but they are clear on one point: that a family
relationship captures its essence. My best interpretation of 
the concept of "closeness" is this: a close relationship is
one in which one's interests are highly impacted by the 
actions and well-being of another. The scenarios were 
designed to reflect both this interpretation and the 
literature's typification of a "close" relationship as a 
family one.
17
The research design allowed control over confounding 
variables as follows. First, to keep effects from individual 
differences in backgrounds and values to a minimum, the 
volunteers were drawn from the College*s rather homogeneous 
pool of undergraduate students. Then, to allow for the 
examination of effects from prior experience with mental 
illness, the volunteers were asked questions regarding their 
familiarity with mental illness and its treatment. Each 
volunteer was then ranked on a scale of "low," "moderate," 
and "high" familiarity.
Despite the advantages afforded through the use of 
scenarios, the methodology presented some problems and 
limitations:
(1) The problem of "responding in character." Although 
each question reminded the volunteer to answer as if he or 
she were "the person whose situation is described in the 
scenario," there was no way to ensure that the volunteers did 
so or that they did so consistently.
(2) The problem of hypothetical situations. It may be 
that, even if the volunteers did answer "in character," the 
scenarios lacked the immediacy and urgency necessary to 
elicit responses truly representative of "real life" 
situations.
(3) The problem of similar situations. Even though the 
"family" and "non-family" scenarios were designed to be as 
similar as possible, subtle differences may have remained.
18
GENERAL FINDINGS FROM THE RESEARCH
As just described, the research employed two independent 
variables (the closeness of the decision maker, the presence 
or absence of a possibly "de-satisficing" event), one control 
variable (familiarity with mental illness and its treatment), 
and three dependent variables (characterizations of the 
situation, explanations of the situation, responses to the 
situation). To determine if the independent variables 
impacted the dependent variables in any significant way, the 
results for each independent variable were examined under 
four conditions: (1) with "familiarity" controlled, (2) with
the other independent variable controlled, (3) with 
"familiarity" and the other independent variable controlled, 
and (4) with neither "familiarity" nor the other independent 
variable controlled. Although both of the independent 
variables were expected to have an significant impact on the 
dependent variables, only the "closeness" variable did. This 
failure on the part of the "event" variable suggests that the 
methodology did not portray that variable believably enough. 
"Familiarity," meanwhile, appeared to play a limited role in 
modifying the effects of "closeness." The findings below are 
presented in terms of those independent and control variables 
for which the data seem reasonably valid: (1) the closeness
of the relationship between the decision-maker and the 
symptomatic person, and (2) the decision-maker's familiarity 
with mental illness. Findings for the "event" variable are 
presented in Appendix B.
19
RESPONDENTS' CHARACTERIZATIONS OF THE SITUATION
In the first section of the survey, the volunteers were 
asked to characterize the situation described in the 
scenario. There were seven questions: (1) "Do you find the
situation problematic?" (2) "Do you find the situation 
worrisome?" (3) "Do you find the situation threatening?"
(4) "Do you find the situation challenging?" (5) "Do you 
find the situation annoying?" (6) "Do you find the situation 
embarrassing?" and (7) "Do you find the situation 
frightening?" Three answers were available for each: "no,"
"somewhat," or "yes."
Although previous research suggests that, with other 
factors held constant, family should find symptomatic 
behavior more "problematic" and "threatening" than 
non-family, no significant differences of those sorts were 
found in the current study (see Tables 2 and 3).
Table 2. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
problematic?"
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 2.3% 2.4%
"somewhat" 13.6% 16.7%
"yes" 84.1% 81.0%
(N—44) (N=42)
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Table 3. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
threatening?"
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 20.5% 19.0%
"somewhat" 56.8% 59.5%
"yes" 22.7% 21.4%
(N=44) (N=42)
Instead, the groups varied on other measures. For instance, 
although very few family and non-family respondents found the 
situation "embarrassing," significantly more family than 
non-family respondents found it so (see Table 4). Among 
those relatively unfamiliar with mental illness and its 
treatment this difference was even greater (see Table 5). 
While the majority of low familiarity non-family respondents 
did not find the situation embarrassing (85 percent), the 
majority (56.3 percent) of low familiarity family respondents 
described it as "somewhat embarrassing" or "embarrassing."
A somewhat similar pattern appears in the degree to 
which the volunteers found the situation "annoying." The 
general trend was to find the situation "somewhat annoying" 
(see Table 6). Among those reporting high familiarity with 
mental illness, however, differences appear between the 
family and non-family groups (see Table 7). Whereas high 
familiarity family respondents found the situation "not
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annoying" (57 percent) or "somewhat annoying" (42.9 percent), 
high familiarity non-family respondents found it "somewhat 
annoying" or "annoying" (50 percent each) — a clear and 
significant difference.
Table 4. Family 
the question "Do 
embarrassing?"
and non-family responses to 
you find the situation
FAMILY NON-■FAMILY
"no" 56.8% 73.8%
"somewhat" 31.8% 26.2%
"yes" 11.4% 0.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
Sig. < .05 (Chi Square)
Table 5. Among those reporting low 
familiarity with mental illness, family 
non-family responses to the question "Do 
find the situation embarrassing?"
and
you
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 43*8% 85. 0%
"somewhat" 31.3% 15.0%
"yes" 25.0% 0.0%
(N=16) (N=20)
Sig. < .05 (Chi Square)
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Table 6. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
annoying?"
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 31.8% 23.8%
"somewhat" 54.5% 50.0%
"yes" 13.6% 26.2%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table 7. Among those reporting high 
familiarity with mental illness, family and 
non-family responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation annoying?"
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 57.1% 0.0%
"somewhat" 42.9% 50.0%
"yes" 0.0% 50.0%
(N=7) (N=6)
Sig. < .05 (Chi Square)
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On the remaining measures the family and non-family groups 
responded very similarly and familiarity with mental illness 
did not have a significant impact. Respondents generally 
characterized the situation as "challenging,” "worrisome," 
and somewhere between "somewhat frightening" and 
"frightening" (See Tables 8, 9, and 10).
Table 8. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
challenging?"
"no"
"somewhat"
"yes"
FAMILY 
6 .8% 
22.7% 
70.5% 
(N=44)
NON-FAMILY
11.9%
33.3%
54.8%
(N=42)
Table 9. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
worrisome?"
"no"
"somewhat"
"yes"
FAMILY
2.3%
13.6%
84.1%
(N=44)
NON-FAMILY
2.4%
14.3%
83.3%
(N=42)
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Table 10. Family and non-family responses to 
the question "Do you find the situation 
frightening?"
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
"no" 15.9% 4.8%
"somewhat" 36.4% 50.0%
"yes" 47.7% 45.2%
(N=44) (N=42)
RESPONDENTS' EXPLANATIONS OF THE SITUATION
The previous research leads us to expect that, with all 
other factors held equal, family are less likely than 
non-family to choose a "mental illness" explanation. To see 
if this was true in the survey groups, the volunteers were 
presented with four possible explanations for the 
hypothetical situation: mental illness, physical illness,
stress, and personal conflict. These were presented in 
pairs, each paired against the other, and the volunteers were 
asked to choose the "most likely" explanation from each pair 
(see Appendix C for the format of this question). Answers 
were recorded such that relative likelihood of the "mental 
illness" explanation would result in a score of three (as it 
was chosen over each of the other options) and relative 
unlikelihood would result in lower scores (as the "mental 
illness" explanation lost out to the other options one or 
more times).
With this in mind, the scores for the "mental illness"
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explanation are interesting (see Table 11). Among both 
family and non-family the most common score was one, 
indicating low likelihood for the "mental illness" 
explanation. The distribution of higher scores was mixed. 
Scores of two, indicating a slightly higher likelihood for 
the "mental illness" explanation, were more common among 
non-family than family. Scores of three (indicating very 
high likelihood), however, were more common among family than 
non-family. These mixed patterns persisted even when the 
volunteers' familiarity with mental illness was controlled 
(see Table 12).
Table 11. Family and non-family scores for 
explanation of the situation.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: least likely 
mental illness
0 .0% 4.8%
1 47.7% 50.0%
2 18.2% 28.6%
3: most likely 
mental illness
34.1% 16.7%
(N=44) (N=42)
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Table 12. Family and non-family scores for 
explanation of the situation, controlling for 
familiarity with mental illness.
0: least likely 
mental illness
1:
2 :
3: most likely 
mental illness
low familiarity 
FAMILY
0.0%
62.5%
18.8%
18.8%
(N=16)
NON-FAMILY
5.0%
55. 0% 
30.0% 
10. 0%
(N=20)
moderate familiarity 
FAMILY
0: least likely 0.0!
mental illness
1: 47.6!
2 : 9 .5!
3: most likely 42.9!
mental illness
NON-FAMILY
0.0%
53 . 6% 
18.8% 
25.0%
(N=21) (N=16)
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high familiarity 
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: least likely 
mental illness
0.0% 16.7%
1 14.3% 16.7%
2 42.9% 50.0%
3: most likely 
mental illness
42.9% 16.7%
(N=7) (N=6)
RESPONDENTS' REACTIONS TO THE SITUATION
In the final part of the survey, the volunteers were 
given a list of seven possible strategies they might pursue 
in response to their hypothetical situations. They then were 
asked to pick the three most likely strategies and rank them 
in order of descending likelihood. In each case, these were 
scored one through three — one for the least likely of the 
three and three for the most likely. The four neglected 
strategies all were scored zero.
For both family and non-family, four strategies were 
very unlikely: taking John to a hospital, taking him to a
mental hospital, taking him to a physician, and calling the 
police (Tables 13-16). A fifth strategy, taking John to a 
counselor, was likely for both groups (Table 17). Opinions 
on the final two strategies were less shared or clear-cut. 
Nearly half of each group, for example, listed "calling a 
mental health hotline" as their most likely or second most 
likely strategy. In both groups, however, this number was
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balanced out by many for whom the "hotline" strategy never 
made the top three (see Table 18). Opinions on the "taking 
John to see a psychiatrist" strategy, meanwhile, were clearly 
and significantly different. Family members, not non-family 
members, were more likely to seek psychiatric help for John 
(see Table 19).
Table 13. Likelihood to take John to a
hospital. Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 88.6% 85.7%
1: 11.4% 11.9%
2: 0.0% 2.4%
3: very likely 0.0% 0.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table 14. Likelihood to take John to a mental
hospital. Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 86.4% 88.1%
1: 13.6% 9.5%
2: 0.0% 2.4%
3: very likely 0.0% 0.0%
(N=s44) (N=42)
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Table 15. Likelihood to take John to a 
physician. Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 56.8% 40.5%
1: 29.5% 21.4%
2: 6.8% 19 . 0%
3: very likely 6.8% 19 . 0%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table 16,. Likelihood to call the police. 
Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 100.0% 100.0%
1: 0.0% 0.0%
2: 0.0% 0.0%
3: very likely 0.0% 0.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
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Table 17. Likelihood to take John to a 
counselor. Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 11.4% 14 .3%
1: 0.0% 7.1%
2: 22.7% 33 . 3%
3: very likely 65.9% 45.2%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table 18. Likelihood to call a mental health 
hotline. Family and non-family responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 40.9% 28.6%
1: 18.2% 19.0%
2: 22.7% 21.4%
3: very likely 18.2% 31.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
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Table 19. Likelihood to take John to a 
psychiatrist. Family and non-family 
responses.
FAMILY NON-FAMILY
0: unlikely 15.9 42.9%
1 27.3% 31.0%
2 47.7% 21.4%
3: very likely 9.1% 4.8%
(N=44) (N=42)
Sig. < .05 (Chi Square)
DISCUSSION
Recall that the "de-satisficing" events written into the 
scenarios involved a new romance for the decision-maker — a 
romance with someone who might be frightened away by John's 
behavior. The aim of these events was, simply, to thoroughly 
"de-satisfice" the decision-maker's current strategy toward 
John so that he or she would have to find a new one. The 
interest was whether the strategies chosen by decision-makers 
in "de-satisficed" situations differed significantly from 
those chosen by decision-makers in more "satisficed" 
situations. The results, as we have seen (again, see 
Appendix B), indicate no significant differences between 
these groups. For this two interpretations seem possible.
The first would suggest that, contrary to suggestions from
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the previous research, such events have little or no impact 
on relationships between decision-makers and symptomatic 
persons. The second would suggest that the particular 
"de-satisficing" events employed in the research might not 
have "de-satisficed" in the way they were intended.
This second interpretation seems more likely. As 
mentioned before, the scenario format presents certain 
limitations. The greatest of these is its inability to 
create meaningful analogs of certain social phenomena. It is 
one thing to imagine oneself as a baby sitter or family 
member confronted with odd behavior. It is probably a very 
different and more difficult thing to realistically imagine 
how one would act when gripped by fear and love and guilt. 
This research required such a task. The results seem to 
indicate that meaningful analogs of such surging emotions are 
somewhat beyond the capabilities of simple scenarios. This 
does not mean that any attempts to create analogs of 
"de-satisficing" events are doomed to failure. It may well 
be that other methods will work or that scenarios can create 
meaningful analogs of less emotional "de-satisficing" events.
As heartening as these possibilities may be, they do not 
alleviate the current difficulty. Recall that the research 
problem, as originally stated, concerned two independent 
variables: (1) closeness of the relationship between
decision-maker and symptomatic person and (2) presence or 
absense of a "de-satisficing" event. Questions regarding the 
validity of our "de-satisficing" variable now push half of
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that problem temporarily beyond our reach. Our chance to 
examine suggestions from the previous research on the effects 
of "de-satisficing" events, then, is delayed, and the range 
of our discussion narrows considerably.
Given this difficulty, might it not be that other 
elements of the scenarios also failed to create the kinds of 
conditions they were designed to create? Perhaps. Recall, 
however, that the research attempted to create controlled 
analogs, not exact duplicates, of certain "real-life" 
decision-making situations and processes. Although these 
analogs may have failed to approximate some "real life" 
conditions (the impact of "de-satisficing" events), they seem 
to have successfully approximated others (the 
"family"/"non-family" distinction). It is in the light and 
limitations of that success that the following observations 
are made.
First, the findings suggest that, although the family of 
a symptomatic person may indeed find that person's behavior 
"problematic" or "threatening," non-family persons may find 
it equally so. Although this seems to rub directly against 
suggestions from the previous research, it need not do so. 
Instead, it may be (as I suggested before) that Yarrow (1955) 
and others have mistaken the effects of the family situation 
for the effects of the family relationship. In other words, 
they may have mistaken the effects of "living with a person" 
for the effects of "being related to a person."
Second, this is not to suggest that, given identical
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situations, family and non-family will perceive things 
identically. Indeed, as we saw on the scores for 
"embarrassment" and "annoyance," similar circumstances do not 
necessarily make for similar descriptions. These same 
differences also suggest that it may be simplistic and 
misleading to speak (as Whitt and Meile, 1985, and others do) 
as if "problems" exist in discrete and generic units that can 
be stacked up and measured against one another. When a 
careful understanding is necessary, a more fruitful approach 
might be to drop the generic "problems" line of inquiry and 
pursue the various types of problems involved: embarassment,
annoyance, fear, and so on.
Third, these findings also suggest that familiarity with 
mental illness and its treatment plays a key role in these 
negotiations. At very low and very high levels of 
familiarity, for instance, family and non-family sometimes 
had very different perceptions of the same situation. At low 
levels, family were much more embarassed by the situation 
than were non-family. At high levels, meanwhile, non-family 
were much more annoyed than were family. These findings 
suggest that familiarity with mental illness may play a 
crucial role in how symptoms are perceived, that it may 
decrease the embarassment felt by family members, and that it 
may increase the annoyance others feel toward a symptomatic 
person. The previous research has ignored this variable. In 
future research it must be taken into account.
Fourth, the results suggest that family may not be less
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likely than non-family to explain the behavior of a 
symptomatic person in terms of "mental illness." The results 
on this topic, you may recall, were mixed. Neither family 
nor non-family seemed likely to use the "mental illness" 
explanation for John's behavior. Similarly, both groups 
shied away from the "mental hospital" strategy and were 
ambivalent about the "mental health hotline" strategy.
Family, however, were more likely than non-family to take 
John to a psychiatrist. Taken together, these results 
suggest that although both family and non-family avoided the 
"mental illness" explanation, family were somewhat more 
likely to make decisions that could lead to such an 
explanation.
To suggest that "closeness" plays a role in this way, 
however, is a far cry from accepting Yarrow1s (1955) notion 
of "personal threat" as the motivating factor in these 
negotiations. Instead, it suggests that other factors 
associated with close personal relationships 
— responsibilities, obligations, and so on — may also play 
important roles in such negotiations. The non-family 
decision-makers, for instance, may have felt that certain 
decisions, such as deciding whether John should be exposed to 
a system that might label him "mentally ill," lay outside 
their responsibilities. The family decision-makers, 
meanwhile, while perhaps equally uncomfortable with such 
decisions, may have felt more responsible and, thus, more 
compelled to make them.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It seems, then, that although Yarrow's work (along with 
its echoes and refinements in the work of Whitt and Meile and
others) is helpful, its focus on personal interest may be too
narrow. Yarrow (1955) and others after her have proposed a 
simple causal relationship. While this simplicity makes 
their arguments very easy to understand and cite, it may also 
rob them of their robustness.
It may be that the more complex "satisficing" model 
suggested by March and Simon (1958; echoed, perhaps 
unwittingly, in Emerson and Messinger, 1977, and Sampson et 
al, 1964) provides a more accurate understanding of these 
negotiations. It is unfortunate that the part of this 
research specifically aimed at examining that model failed to 
result in reliable data. It leaves us in the uncomfortable 
position of having data with which to point out problems but 
without which to point out possible solutions.
Obviously, this paper is not the final word on these
subjects. Instead, I hope it might serve as a "first" word,
a jump-start to a stalled conversation. For nearly three 
decades, research on the negotiations which lead to lay 
diagnoses of mental illness have been nearly unanimous on one 
point: the family of a symptomatic person are more likely
than others to find that person's behavior problematic but, 
due to the "personal threat" involved in recognizing mental 
illness in someone so close, they are less likely than others
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to see that behavior as evidence of mental illness. The 
findings from the present research suggest, simply, that this 
may not be so. My aim in saying this is not to question the 
validity of the previous research. Limitations imposed by 
sample size and methodology alone would make any such 
statements problematic. My aim, instead, is to suggest that 
the matter may not be as neatly resolved as some have 
suggested.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
Throughout this work I have pointed out methodological 
and theoretical problems in the previous research and in my 
own research. Along the way I have also made suggestions as 
to how these difficulties might be avoided or corrected.
Here I would like to make some final suggestions of that sort 
so that future research in this vein might be more fruitful.
Researchers interested in pursuing the methodology 
employed here should consider using samples from other 
populations to see if the outcomes suggested by the previous 
research are more or less true among those groups. These 
researchers might also consider employing scenarios featuring 
different "symptoms" to discover whether patterns differ 
significantly in response to different behaviors.
Researchers interested in refining the methodology 
should look into making the scenarios more dynamic and 
life-like. One approach might be to make them longer and
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more involved. Another approach might be to abandon the 
written format for active role-plays in which subjects 
interact with a person trained to portray mental illness.
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Appendix A: Sample scenarios.
This first scenario was used in the "family" conditions. 
Paragraphs 1-5 detail the volunteer*s "relationship" with the 
symptomatic person, present the symptomatic behavior, 
describe past strategies, and place the volunteer in a 
decision-making situation. A scenario consisting of only 
these paragraphs fits experimental condition 3 ("family" 
responds to "event absent"). When paragraph 6, which 
introduces a potentially "de-satisficing" event, is added, 
the scenario fits experimental condition 1 ("family" responds 
to "event present").
A year ago your father’s job required a temporary (two 
year) move overseas and, although he and your mother had 
hoped you would join them, they understood when you and your 
13 year-old brother, John, decided to stay. After all, both 
of you had just settled into school (you in college; your 
brother in junior high) and it seemed a shame to pull you out 
just as you were making friends and becoming comfortable 
there. Your parents also were persuaded by the 
responsibility you had always demonstrated — and by your 
promise to take care of and watch over your brother until the 
overseas assignment ended and they returned.
Before your parents moved, they found you and your 
brother a townhouse and set up a fund from which you could 
draw money for tuition, rent, food, and other major expenses. 
Other everyday living expenses, they explained, would have to 
come from your part-time job.
This year has brought a lot of changes; You and your
brother have grown up a lot, and you have also grown much
closer, sharing good times and seeing each other through the 
bad ones as you never had before. In recent weeks, however, 
John*s behavior has begun to worry you. You and he used to 
spend a lot of time together in the evenings, but lately he*s 
become very withdrawn. Quite often, by the time you come 
home from work and classes, he's already eaten dinner and
shut himself away in his room. When you knock on his door he
rarely comes out. Instead, he usually stays in there 
listening to the radio and talking to himself. At first you 
thought he may have been talking to school friends on the 
telephone, but the line's always clear when you check.
When you have seen John, his behavior has been very 
unpredictable. Usually he's very quiet, but on a few 
occasions, he's exploded in a rage over tiny things. Once he 
even ran to the kitchen, pulled out a knife, and started
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slashing the living room curtains to bits. This sort of 
behavior seems so out-of-character. Just a month or so ago 
you were thinking you knew your brother better than anyone, 
but now you1 re not so sure.
So far you've dealt with John's behavior in a couple of 
ways. You tried and gave up on the "let's talk about it" 
approach because it just seemed to make him more withdrawn. 
Lately your efforts have been less forward. When you're 
watching TV at night you'll sometimes yell upstairs that 
something really good is on, or you'll laugh loudly, hoping 
he'll become intrigued and come down to see what's on. You'd 
hoped that maybe that would bring you together and give you 
something to talk about — something that might lead to a 
discussion of what's really going on. So far, though, those 
strategies haven't worked as often or as well as you'd hoped 
they would.
And there's something else: Recently, during classes
and over a few lunch and dinner dates, you've been getting to 
know a girl whose company you enjoy. She's made no secret of 
the fact that she feels similarly about you. This is a 
welcome relief from your day-to-day concerns and studies.
You don't want to rush this new relationship, but you don't 
want to blow it either. Your dates so far have involved 
meals or movies "out" or over at her place, but lately she's 
been hinting that you two should spend an evening at your 
place. You tried to turn her off the idea by telling her 
that you live with your younger brother, but that didn't 
work. She said she'd be "happy" to meet him and that she was 
looking forward to "getting to know" him. What you fear is 
that this girl might come over, find John talking to himself 
or ripping up the curtains, get scared, and stop being 
interested in you. One way around this might be to never let 
her come over and meet your brother, but you're afraid that 
will just drive her away also — that she may interpret your 
reluctance as a sign of distrust or disinterest.
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Appendix A: Sample scenarios, continued.
This second scenario was used in the "non-family” conditions. 
Paragraphs 1-3 detail the volunteer's "relationship" with the 
symptomatic person, present the symptomatic behavior, 
describe past strategies, and place the volunteer in a 
decision-making situation. A scenario consisting of only 
these paragraphs fits experimental condition 4 ("non-family" 
responds to "event absent"). When paragraph 4, which 
introduces a potentially "de-satisficing" event, is added, 
the scenario fits experimental condition 2 ("non-family" 
responds to "event present").
On occasions over the past year or two you've "babysat" 
John — who is now 13 — while his father^ and mother were away. 
The first time you did it as a favor (John's dad was your 
Biology professor at the time). You've continued because of 
the extra cash and quiet study time it provides. Over this 
time John's parents have come to trust and value your 
judgment and responsibility — so much so that they often 
won't go out unless you are available to sit. In the past 
their longest trips lasted only a couple of days. During 
those times you would stay in their home and keep John 
company when he got home from school. The trip they just 
left on, however, will be significantly longer — a full 
month. You're being paid well and so far it has been a nice 
break from dormitory life, but John's behavior has begun to 
worry you. In the past, you and he used to spend time 
together in the evenings, working on homework or watching TV, 
but he seems very withdrawn this time. Quite often, by the 
time you return from classes, he's already eaten dinner and 
shut himself away in his room. When you knock, he rarely 
answers or comes out. Instead, he usually stays in there 
listening to the radio and talking to himself. At first you 
thought he may have been talking to school friends on the 
telephone, but the line's always clear when you check.
When you have seen John, his behavior has been very 
unpredicatable. Usually he's very quiet, but on a few 
occasions he's exploded in a rage over tiny things. Once he 
even ran into the kitchen, pulled out a knife, and started 
slashing at the living room curtains. This sort of seems 
out-of-character. You've been "sitting" with John for a 
while now and thought you knew him pretty well, but now 
you're not so sure.
So far you've dealt with John's behavior in a couple of 
ways. You tried and gave up on the "let's talk about it"
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approach because it just seemed to make him more withdrawn. 
Lately your efforts have been less forward. When you're 
watching TV at night you'll sometimes shout upstairs that 
something really good is on, or you'll laugh loudly, hoping 
John will come down to see what's on. You hoped that sort of 
strategy might lead to a discussion of what's wrong, but so 
far it hasn't worked as often or as well as you'd hoped it 
would.
And there's something else. During classes you've been 
getting to know a girl whose company you enjoy. She's made 
no secret of the fact that she feels similarly about you.
This is a welcome relief from your day-to-day concerns and 
studies. You don't want to rush this new relationship, but 
you don't want to blow it either. Last week you told this 
girl about how you'd be "sitting" with John and how it might 
be fun for the three of you to spend some time time together 
— kind of a prelude to real "dating." Now you're wondering 
if that would be a good idea after all. What you fear is 
that this girl might come over, find John talking to himself 
or ripping up the curtains, get scared, and stop being 
interested in you. One way around this might be to never let 
her come over, but you're afraid that will just drive her 
away also — that she may interpret your reluctance as a sign 
of distrust or disinterest.
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Appendix B: Results for the "de-satisficing” event variable
Responses for "event present" and "event absent" conditions.
Table a. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation problematic?"
"no"
"somewhat"
"yes"
PRESENT
2.3%
22.7%
75.0%
(N=44)
ABSENT
2.4%
7.1%
90.5%
(N=42)
Table b. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation threatening?"
PRESENT ABSENT
"no"
"somewhat"
"yes"
20.5% 
54.5% 
25. 0% 
(N=44)
19.0% 
61.9% 
19.0% 
(N=4 2)
Table c. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation embarrassing?"
"no"
"somewhat"
"yes"
PRESENT 
65.9% 
29.5% 
4.5% 
(N=44)
ABSENT 
76.2% 
16.7% 
7.1% 
(N=42)
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Table d. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation annoying?"
PRESENT ABSENT
"no" 31.8% 23.8%
"somewhat" 50.0% 54.8%
"yes" 18.2% 21.4%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table e. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation challenging?"
PRESENT ABSENT
"no" 13.6% 4.8%
"somewhat" 34.1% 21.4%
"yes" 52.3% 73.8%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table f. Responses to the question "Do you 
find the situation worrisome?"
PRESENT ABSENT
"no" 4.5% 0.0%
"somewhat" 18.2% 9.5%
"yes" 77.3% 90.5%
(N=44) (N=42)
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Table g. Responses to the question 
find the situation frightening?"
"Do you
PRESENT ABSENT
"no" 13.6% 7 .1%
"somewhat" 40.9% 45.2%
"yes" 45.5% 47.6%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table h. Scores 
situation.
for explanation of the
PRESENT ABSENT
0: least likely 
mental illness
2.3% 2.4%
1: 54.5% 42.9%
2: 22.7% 23.8%
3: most likely 
mental illness
20.5% 31.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table i. Likelihood to take John 
hospital.
to a
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 90.9% 83.3%
Is 9.1% 14.3%
2: 0.0% 2.4%
3: very likely 0.0% 0.0%
(N=44) (N=42)
46
Table j. Likelihood to take 
hospital.
John to a mental
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 88 . 6% 85.7%
1: 11.4% 11.9%
2: 0.0% 2.4%
3: very likely 0.0% 
(N=44)
0.0%
(N=42)
Table k. Likelihood to 
physician.
take John to a
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 47.7% 50. 0%
1: 27.3% 23 . 8%
2 : 15.9% 9.5%
3: very likely 9.1% 
(N=44)
16.7% 
(N=4 2)
Table 1. Likelihood to call the police.
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 100.0% 100.0%
1: 0.0% 0.0%
2: 0.0% 0.0%
3: very likely 0.0% 
(N=44)
0.0%
(N=42)
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Table m. Likelihood to take John to a 
counselor.
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 13.6% 11.9%
1: 2.3% 4.8%
2: 25. 0% 31.0%
3: very likely 59.1% 52.4%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table n. Likelihood to call a mental health 
hotline.
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 34.1% 35.7%
1: 25.0% 11.9%
2: 18.2% 26.2%
3: very likely 22.7% 26.2%
(N=44) (N=42)
Table o. Likelihood to take John to a 
psychiatrist.
PRESENT ABSENT
0: unlikely 25 . 0% 33.3%
Is 25.0% 33.3%
2: 40.9% 28.6%
3: very likely 9.1% 4.8%
(N=44) (N=4 2)
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Appendix C: Format of the "explanation” 
section from the survey
Below are s.orae terms that might be used to explain the problems 
encountered in the scenario. They are presented in pairs so that 
you must choose which is the better of the two. Take the pairs 
one at a time and weigh the explanations, comparing only within 
the pairs.
If you were the person in the situation described, how would you 
explain the problems encountered? Are the problems more likely 
the result of...
a. physical illness or mental illness?
[ ] physical illness [ ] mental illness
b. mental illness or stress?
[ ] mental illness [ ] stress
c. stress or personal conflict? 
[ J stress [ ] personal conflict
d. personal conflict or physical illness?
[ ] personal conflict [ ] physical illness
e. physical illness or stress?
[ ] physical illness ( ] stress
f. personal conflict or mental illness?
[ ] personal conflict [ ] mental illness
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